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Abstract— In recent years, many Blockchain based frame-
works for transacting commodities on a congestible network
have been proposed. In particular, as the number of controllable
grid connected assets increases, there is a need for a decentral-
ized, coupled economic and control mechanism to dynamically
balance the entire electric grid. Blockchain based Transactive
Energy (TE) systems have gained significant momentum as an
approach to sustain the reliability and security of the power
grid in order to support the flexibility of electricity demand.
What is lacking in these designs, however, is a mechanism
that physically verifies all the energy transactions, to keep
the various inherently selfish players honest. In this paper,
we introduce a secure peer-to-peer network mechanism for
the physical validation of economic transactions cleared over
a distributed ledger. The framework is secure in the sense
that selfish and malicious agents that are trying to inject
false data into the network are prevented from adversely
affecting the optimal functionality of the verification process by
detecting and isolating them from the communication network.
Preliminary simulations focusing on TE show the workings of
this framework.
I. INTRODUCTION
Stressors on the demand and supply chain and conges-
tion in critical infrastructures like transportation networks
(e.g., rails, highways, airports, sea-ports), telecommunication
networks (by frequency-bounded airwaves or cables), and
utilities (e.g., electric power, water, gas, oil, sewage) are
increasing at a rapid rate [1]. At the same time, there
is a great opportunity to incorporate machine intelligence
to manage these infrastructures efficiently. Yet, controlling
the entire infrastructure in a centralized manner becomes
untenable with the rise in the number of controllable entities
in the system.
Electric utilities, in particular, are at the cusp of a water-
shed moment, where they will experience an enormous
changes with the onset of an era when electric vehicles,
grid level energy storage, and prosumers who have the
resources to privately feed the grid via local generation (for
instance, solar panels and storage) [2]. This will increase the
dimension of the controllable space and upset the status quo.
With the increase in the number of edge-network devices, the
idea of allowing for an open energy market where each of
the so-called prosumers that may both produce and consume
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the commodity under question, has gained momentum. This
notion is often referred to as Transactive Energy (TE) [3]. As
such, several control frameworks for TE have been proposed.
While originally TE was often tied to a new congestion
pricing model for power utilities, these ideas have come
increasingly under scrutiny. As grid operators, and utility
in particular, can only operate behind the meter, ensuring
the dynamic balance of supply and demand of power in real
time as well as the security of such an open grid, remains an
open question. This is mainly due to the vulnerability of the
edge devices to external interventions, and the consequences
of these vulnerabilities in a highly connected system are far
reaching and pose damages beyond the meter [4].
A. Background
Recently, TE has gained traction again as an applica-
tion for distributed Blockchain [4]–[8], the same trust-less
technology used for crypto-currencies. Blockchain platform
to develop TE solutions come in two forms: permission-
less/public or permissioned [9]. Public blockchain platforms
provide a level of trust in what are, arguably, otherwise
completely trustless environments. Bitcoin, Ethereum, ripple,
hydrachain and many other platforms are open to anyone
who may want to participate, even anonymously. To prevent
tampering with the content of the ledger, public Blockchains
requires proof-of-work, proof-of-stake or proof-of-authority
consensus algorithms so that these completely trustless envi-
ronments can work. Permissioned Blockchains rely primarily
on an authentication mechanism that manages the authoriza-
tions for appending new transactions on the ledger. Literature
review shows the application of smart metering infrastructure
in designing a Blockchain empowered TE system. Work done
in [5] provides an architecture that connects IoT devices to
smart meter’s ports. The distribution system operator uses
this metering infrastructure as the role of the oracle in the
architecture. The authors in [10] proposed a Blockchain
based distributed ledger for storing the data acquired from
metering devices as energy transactions in a secured and
tamper proof manner. In [4], [6] the authors proposed a
Blockchain based meter that updates the Blockchain by
creating a unique timestamp block for verification in a dis-
tributed ledger whenever a transaction takes place. Authors
in [11] proposed smart contracts protocol between the smart
meter and the the sovereign blockchain network where, the
smart contracts are triggered and executed based on the
activity detected; malicious or appropriate. In [12], authors
proposed the idea of a middle-ware controller that works as
an interface between the smart meter and the grid and also
ar
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acts as an input source for smart contracts.
All functional aspects of TE enabled by Blockchain, from
the bidding and pricing to the billing phase, can be orches-
trated running Smart Contracts [13] over the Blockchain
distributed ledger network infrastructure. There are several
benefits of such an implementation: all transactions are, once
stored on the ledger, transparent to the participants who
have an identical copy of the ledger. New transactions are
hash-chained when appended to the ledger, an operation
that makes them immutable. This improves the resiliency
of the electric grid against forms of cyber-attacks aimed at
hampering the integrity and availability of the data.
The focus of this paper, though, is not security from
external nefarious interventions, but rather from threats that
exist within a TE infrastructure where selfish players have an
intrinsic incentive to cheat about their use or their production
of the commodities that they are trading. To the best of the
authors’ knowledge, much of the literature on Blockchain
TE fails to account for the physical validation of the ground
truth. It is true that transactions, once recorded on the ledger,
are signed off transparently and the record is immutable.
However, without any metering record that corroborates the
physical delivery of the transaction amounts, the report in
the ledger goes essentially unverified. That is, Blockchain,
in its current form, is not equipped to deal with such
transgressions.
B. Contribution
In this paper, we assume that any participant in the TE
marketplace might be a selfish or malicious entity trying to
exploit vulnerabilities to gain an unfair advantage. To keep
participants honest, we assume the stakeholder have access
to sensor measurements that represent a distributed version
of an advance metering infrastructure. These sensors measure
various physical quantities from the grid and, as long as they
are all consistent with the laws of physics, this is sufficient
to verify that the power injections schedules produced during
the TE market clearing process was honored. Since the sens-
ing infrastructure is distributed, and selfish participants may
want to misreport measurements, we take inspiration from
the scheme proposed in [14] in the context of power system
State Estimation (SE) across different Regional Transmission
Operators (RTO) and we adapt it to our verification task.
The scheme includes in the SE the computation of a trust
score designed detect False Data Injection (FDI) attacks. Our
underlying idea is to extend this approach to ensure that the
proposed distributed verification process for a TE Blockchain
can be carried out in a trust-less fashion.
We note that FDI attacks in cyber-physical systems in
general and on SE for power systems in particular, have
attracted a tremendous amount of publications [15]–[17]; a
brief self-contained introduction is provided in Section IV-B.
To summarize, the main point of this paper is to address
the verification of the transactions beyond the digital realms
of the ledger in a trust-less and distributed environment,
considering that selfish prosumers should be kept honest
and that requires monitoring the physical operating state
of the network. Towards this end, a scheme that should
be incorporated between the market clearing phase and the
billing phase is proposed and referred to as Robust State
Verification.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we describe the cyber-physical infrastructure. In Section III,
the laws of physics with regard to the power flow are
defined. In Section IV, the decentralized verification problem
is presented and a corresponding Robust State Verification
algorithm is proposed. In Section V, numerical simulations
are presented. Finally, we conclude in Section VI.
Notations: Boldfaced lower-case (resp. upper-case) letters
denote vectors (resp. matrices) and xi (Xij) denotes the
ith element of a vector x (the ijth entry of a matrix X).
Calligraphic letters are sets and |A| denotes the cardinality
of a set A.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, a brief description of the entire system is
provided. The TE framework is split into two major layers.
The lower layer comprising of the physical electric grid
with the various prosumers and participants distributed and
connected throughout the grid, and the upper one is the
cyber communication layer. Thus, TE is a Cyber-Physical
System (CPS) as illustrated in Figure 1. The components
are described in detail in the rest of this section.
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Fig. 1: The Blockchain TE architecture
A. Physical System
• An electrical grid, which represents the physical infras-
tructure for the exchange of electricity. The network
can be represented by a graph Ge = (B, Ee), where B
is the set of nodes (buses) and Ee is the set of edges
(lines) connecting the network. Lines are characterized
by admittance parameters yij , ∀ ij ∈ Ee.
• Flexible loads (appliances) and distributed generation
and storage assets, which connect to buses on the
electrical network.
Note: For the sake of the formulation, we assume there
can only be one prosumer per bus b, knowing that
we can denote multiple prosumers on a single bus by
multiple nodes separated by zero impedance edges.
• Electrical sensors and control equipment.
B. Cyber System
The cyber system is comprised of an application layer
which includes participants in the transactive market, secure
policies for settling their transactions, and resources for
computation, communication and data archival based on
Blockchain. More specifically, through smart-contracts, a
TE Blockchain implementation generally support and record
three main collective decisions: 1) the market clearing
decision process; 2) the verification of the transactions and
3) billing.
To improve scalability and maintain privacy through de-
centralization, the buses in the grid are spilt into a set N
of N aggregator regions each of which serves a multitude
of interconnected devices. Bn represents the set of buses
b belonging to an aggregator region n. Here, Bi ∩ Bj =
∅, ∀ i, j ∈ N .
• At the bottom sub-layer, the electric grid is divided into
the several regions and includes prosumer agents, which
can buy and/or sell power and can control flexible loads,
storage and generators that are connected to the bus
subsets Bn above; this is the set of stakeholders in the
TE market;
• The top sub-layer include aggregators N = {1, . . . , N}
which operate on behalf of all prosumers that are con-
nected to one sub-set of buses Bn, n ∈ N . There is one
aggregator per region, and aggregators can coordinate
the entire market because regions are interconnected and
can communicate.
• The coordination takes place over a communication
graph Gc = (N , Ec) where Ec are the communication
links and an edge ij ∈ Ec implies that regions i and
j ∈ N share common state variables (this will be
explained in detail in Section III). The set of neighbors
of a region i ∈ N is denoted by Ni.
The assumption that the system is partitioned in two layers
is without loss of generality, as one can always restrict the
agents to a single home-feeder flattening the architecture and
still fit in the model. Of course the finer is the sectioning the
slower are the peer-to-peer network processes.
Communication of information among the prosumers via
the buses to the aggregators and between the aggregators are
executed via private writing and reading on the distributed
ledgers of the Blockchain, which also contain as smart-
contracts the algorithms and policies that govern the TE
market:
• Prosumers in each region can access the local (regional)
ledger.
• Aggregators can access both the local (regional) ledger
as well as the global (common) ledger.
Through the abstraction of a distributed ledger, communica-
tion, computation, and data archival components are unified
on the Blockchain, providing all the inherent benefits of
security as expected on a Blockchain.
III. ELECTRIC GRID CONSTRAINTS
Before presenting the algorithm for achieving consensus
on what the power injections from the various prosumers in
actuality were, here we introduce the physical behavior and
governing equations of our electric grid model that will be
used as a tool for verification.
A. Physical constraints
Physical constraints relate the sensor measurements
through the laws of physics of the electrical grid. Any
measurable physical quantity in the system can be derived
from the voltage phasors (amplitude and phase of the AC
voltage at each bus) and the grid parameters (admittances).
The voltage phasors are, in fact, called the state of the sys-
tem, and may be measured directly by employing expensive
Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs). In the absence of PMUs,
however, one can measure a number of variables. Since we
focus on distribution systems and the goal we pursue is not
state estimation but rather verifying the injections are close to
what the market established as the schedule, here we use the
DistFlow equations [18], [19], that include quantities more
easily metered. Let an edge in the electrical grid be denoted
by ` = (b, b′) ∈ Ee, where b, b′ ∈ B. Defining the from and
to functions which return the source node and incident node
for an edge respectively, such as:
fr(`) = b, to(`) = b′
The inverse function to−1(b) gives back the edge pointing
to bus b (for a radial graph the to bus b for each edge is
unique) and fr−1(b) returns all the edges originating at bus
b.
Within a time horizon T , at a time t ∈ T , the power flow
equations at each of the branches ` ∈ Ee are given by:
pto(`)(t) = P`(t)−
∑
`′∈fr−1(to(`))
P`′(t)−<(z`)c2`(t) (1a)
qto(`)(t) = Q`(t)−
∑
`′∈fr−1(to(`))
Q`′(t)−=(z`)c2`(t) (1b)
v2fr(`)(t) = v
2
to(`)(t) + 2 (<(z`)P`(t) + =(z`)Q`(t))
− |z`|2c2`(t) (1c)
v2fr(`)(t) =
P 2` (t) +Q
2
`(t)
c2`(t)
. (1d)
All these equations are linear in the bus and branch quan-
tities (pb(t), qb(t), v2b (t)) (respectively the real and reactive
power injections, and the squared voltage magnitudes) and
(P`(t), Q`(t), c
2
`(t)) (respectively the real and reactive power
flows, and the squared current magnitudes) except equa-
tion (1d). However, including an auxiliary variable x′` =
(P 2` + Q
2
`)/c
2
` can simplify the description of the physical
constraints. Let x(t) be the vector of system variables at
time t which contains blocks of the injection variables and
branch variables. For the particular set of equations used in
this paper shown in equation (1), the injection variables are
(pb(t), qb(t), v
2
b (t))
T, ∀b ∈ B, and the branch flow variable
are (Pl(t), Ql(t), c2l (t))
T, ∀ l ∈ Ee. Let x(t) also include
the auxiliary variables and, partition this vector in two parts:
xa(t) containing those variables whose measurements are
available and and xu(t) including the variables that are
not measured. The measurements are noisy versions of the
variables in xa(t), i.e.:
s(t) = xa(t) +w(t), (2)
which means that, within a margin of error that depends on
the noise, they should meet the physical constraints of the
grid given in equation set (1). These physical constraints are
a set of non-linear homogeneous equations; we refer to them
in vector form as follows:
h(x(t)) = h(xa(t),xu(t)) = 0, ∀t ∈ T , (3)
where the definition of h(·) is some appropriate vector
function. Relaxing the constraints by ignoring the non-linear
relationships among the auxiliary variables and the remaining
entries of the vector x, and without loss of generality
equations (1a)−(1d) can be written in the linear form:
Hx =Haxa +Huxu = 0, (4)
The physics of the measurements is represented by s = xa+
 and the physics of the system implies that xa satisfies (4).
Note that the system variables can be further partitioned
per aggregator region. Let x(i)(t) be the copies of variables
in x(t) pertaining to aggregator region i. Since there are
tie-lines among the regions some of the variables in x(i)(t)
will have identical counterparts in the x(j)(t) of a neigh-
boring region j. Measurements from an area s(i) cannot be
independently verified unless one has branch measurements
available; even then, an aggregator should not trust other
aggregators. If mi is the number of variables pertaining to
aggregator region i, then D(i) ∈ Rmi×mi is a diagonal
matrix with [D(i)]kk equal to the number of regions with
which region i has the k-th variable of x(i) in common with,
∀k ∈ [mi]. Similarly D(i) ∈ Rmi×mi is also a diagonal
matrix such that [D
(i)
]kk = 1/[D
(i)]kk if [D(i)]kk 6= 0 and
[D
(i)
]kk = 0 if [D(i)]kk = 0.
From the vantage point of each region i ∈ N , only a subset
of the variables x(i)a are measured, so that s(i) = x
(i)
a +(i).
Also, not all constraints in (4) include the variables x(i). By
isolating the equations that involve buses/lines in region i
the following can be written:
h(i)(x(i)) =H(i)x(i) = 0. (5)
Equations (5) along with sensor measurements s(t) in (2)
play a key role in verifying whether the prosumers’ power
injections match the scheduled transactions, allowing to cor-
rectly bill each prosumer for their actual usage, and possibly
fine prosumers for schedule violations.
Next, in Section IV, we provide a decentralized algorithm
that allows aggregators to use equations (5), along with their
local portion of sensor measurements s(i) to cross verify the
actual power injections in the system.
IV. ROBUST VERIFICATION ALGORITHM
A distributed market breeds an inherent selfishness among
the various players involved, i.e, the prosumers might want
to pay less for what they consume or charge more for what
they produce, and alternatively, they might wish to cheat
the system by not producing what they promised during
the pricing stage. Hence, once the market is cleared, we
have the power injections scheduled as p?(t), measurements
are needed to verify the actual power injections pb(t). But
because no-one can be absolutely trusted to self-police, it is
necessary to stitch measurements together through the power
flow constraints in Section III. The problem of verification
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Fig. 2: State Verification Architecture for a test case with
five aggregator regions.
is similar to the state estimation problem in power systems
monitoring [15], which concerns the estimation of all the
state variables (voltage phasors) from limited measurements.
The goal, however, is fundamentally different: it is to cross-
validate self-reported power injections, to ensure the billing
reflects what was actually exchanged and penalizes discrep-
ancies that jeopardize the physical system stability. As men-
tioned in Section I, the problem of FDIAs in state estimation,
centralized or distributed, has been widely studied. In this
paper, for the verification algorithm, a fully decentralized
implementation of Alternative Direction Method of Multipli-
ers (ADMM) [20], [21] is employed since the grid system is
partitioned into regions whose goal is to individually estimate
the state variables within the region and agreeing about the
variables related to the branches that tie different regions.
An illustration of the system is shown in Figure 2. It is
important to remark that we need to have redundancy in the
measurements to ensure Byzantine Fault Tolerance for the
verification process.
A. Problem Formulation
Let S(i) be the selection matrix that selects the system
variables in x(t) that pertain to the ith region, such that
x(i)(t) = S(i)x(t). Furthermore, let S(i)a be the selection
matrix that selects from x(t) those variables pertaining to
region i whose measurements are available, i.e., x(i)a (t) =
S
(i)
a x(t), and similarly let S
(i)
p be a selection matrix that
extracts the active power variables in the vector x(i)(t). The
state verification problem can be formulated as the following
optimization, written in the form amenable to the ADMM
decomposition:
min
{x(i)(t)}t∈Ti∈N
∑
t∈T
∑
i∈N
(
‖s(i)(t)− x(i)a (t)‖2+ (6)
+ ‖h(i)(x(i)(t))‖22 + c1 ‖p?(i)(t)− S(i)p x(i)‖22
)
s.t. Sijx(i)(t) = Sjix(j)(t),∀ij ∈ Ep, (7)
x(i)(t) = S(i)x(t) , ∀i ∈ N (8)
x(i)a (t) = S
(i)
a x(t), ∀i ∈ N . (9)
where [p?(i)(t)]k = pbk(t), ∀bk ∈ Bi is the scheduled power
flow injections at time t for all bus in region i, and the
consensus among the common variables across neighboring
regions is enforced through (7); more specifically, Sij is the
selection matrix that extracts from x(i) the common variables
between neighboring regions i and j, and the definitions of
the functions h(i)(·) are given in Section III. In words, the
objective is to find the the values of the system variables
that have the minimum residual error with respect to the
measurements, the scheduled injection and fit the physical
model equations with the least residual error, measured in
terms of squared norm. The solution is needed for the
verification since the components of the solution S(i)p x(i)
that correspond to the bus power injections are used in the
Blockchain TE as the closest approximation for the ground
truth for billing; also the severity of their deviations from
the schedule p?b(t)− pab (t) determines the penalties assigned
to the prosumers using the specific bus.
An iterative process to arrive at the minimizer of the
problem in (6) is as follows: for T = {0}
x
(i)
k+1(t) =
(
H(i)
T
H(i)+S(i)a
T
S(i)a +S
(i)
p
T
S(i)p +c2D
(i)
)−1
×
(
S(i)a
T
s(i)(t) + S(i)p
T
p?(i)(t) + c2D
(i)υ
(i)
k (t)
)
,
(10)
ψ
(i)
k+1(t) =D
(i) ∑
j:ij∈Ep
STijSjix
(j)
k+1(t), (11)
υ
(i)
k+1(t) =υ
(i)
k (t) +ψ
(i)
k+1(t)− 0.5
(
ψ
(i)
k (t) + x
(i)
k (t)
)
,
(12)
for all k ≥ 0 until a termination condition is satisfied,
while the ADMM states x(i)0 (t),ψ
(i)
0 (t), and υ
(i)
0 (t) ini-
tialized arbitrarily, to
(
D
(i)∑
j:ij∈Ep S
T
ijSjix
(j)
0 (t)
)
, and to
1
2
(
ψ
(i)
0 + x
(i)
0 (t)
)
respectively. An algorithmic implemen-
tation of the iterative process is presented in Algorithm 1
[ignore Steps 3, 4, 6, 19, and 21 for now]. Figure 2 shows a
pictorial representation of the mechanisms of the algorithm.
Buses in each aggregator region i have access to their
local ledgers LLi. The aggregators, in addition to their
local ledger, also have access to the Global Ledger GL.
The aggregator collects measurements from their buses and
stores them on LLi. Iterates after each ADMM update at
an aggregator are also saved in LLi. Aggregators exchange
parts of their states that correspond to variables on the tie
lines with a neighbor.
Algorithm 1 Robust State Verification; Here LLi ∀i ∈ N
and GL represents the local and global ledgers respectively.
The symbols ⇐ and ⇒ correspond to upload and download
to and from a ledger, respectively.
1: LLi ⇐ Collect local measurements s(i)(t)
2: Initialize the ADMM states according to [14].
3: Initialize trust score pi = 0
4: Initialize disagreements dij = 0, ∀ij ∈ Ep
5: repeat
6: pi− ← pi ⇐ GL
7: ADMM States ⇐ LLi
8: [x(i)(t)]− ← x(i)(t)
9: ADMM update of x(i)(t)
10: LLi ⇐ x(i)(t)
11: for all j : ij ∈ Ep do
12: Open private channel GLij
13: GLij ⇐ Sijx(i)(t)
14: end for
15: for all j : ij ∈ Ep do
16: Sjix
(j)(t)⇐ GLji
17: end for
18: LLi ⇐ Update intermediate states of the ADMM.
19: Run Algorithm 2 to update pi and dij , ∀ij ∈ Ep.
20: until ‖pi−pi−‖∞≤pi or ‖x(i)(t)−[x(i)(t)]−‖∞≤
21: Restart the algorithm with {Gp \ (argmaxi pi)}
B. Threat Model and Robust State Verification
We assume that the adversary (a threat agent or a group of
coordinating agents) is an insider who has legitimate physical
and logical access to the network and ledgers through the
certification mechanism. We also assume that the adversary
has the capability to manipulate sensors measurements, either
by compromising the sensors or the communication between
the sensors and the aggregators. The motivation of attackers
is trying to cheat the systems in order to obtain the financial
benefits or disrupt the verification process.
In fact, sensor values can be forged or spoofed. If a
malicious user is in region j, it may modify the values of
the input measurements, altering aggregator’s j measurement
vector by perturbing the measurement vector as follows:
s˜(j) = s(j) + a(j),
where the perturbation a(j) has non zero entries in the
locations that correspond to the false sensor measurements.
Also, if the aggregator itself acts maliciously, it can inject
false data into the updates of Sjix(j) that are passed to a
neighbor i (see equation (11)). This leads to the discrepancies
in the updates of the neighboring aggregators,
x˜
(i)
k+1(t) =x
(i)
k+1(t) + c2MD
(i)D
(i)
STijSjia
(j)
k (t),
where
M =
(
H(i)
T
H(i) + S(i)a
T
S(i)a + S
(i)
p
T
S(i)p + c2D
(i)
)−1
.
If the vanilla ADMM updates as seen in equations (10)–
(12) is used as is to solve (6), the FDIAs are successful
leading to divergence of the algorithm or in the worst case
convergence to a false optimum. The former is a special case
of Denial of Service attack, where the aggregators are unable
to complete the verification process. When the algorithm
converges to a false optimum, this leads to an FDIA to the
ledger.
Algorithm 2 Detection Loop ;
F (dij ,Sijx
(i)(t), Sjix
(j), ∀j : ij ∈ Ep)
1: Set α
2: GL⇐ Update dij∀j : ij ∈ Ep where,
dij ← αk/4|Sijx(i)(t)||T |
∑
t∈T
‖Sijx(i)(t)−Sjix(j)(t)‖2F
+ (1− αk)dij
3: GL⇒ B, where [B]ij = dij∑
k:k∈Ep dik+
4: Compute pi, the left eigenvector of B, s.t. piTB = piT.
5: Output pi, dij , ∀ij ∈ Ep
In order to detect the attack, we leverage the method pro-
posed in [14]. The methodology is presented in Algorithm 2,
which is a detection subroutine in Algorithm 1 [Step 19] with
initialization given in [Steps 3, 4].
In Algorithm 2, each region i calculates a measure of
disagreement, dij , with a neighboring region j, and B
is the matrix of normalized disagreement scores. A left
eigenvector (pi) ofB (equivalently, the stationary distribution
of a Markov chain with probability transition matrix B)
can be calculated. In general, the presence of malicious
agents will not lead to a convergence, and the algorithm will
assign higher scores for those regions who are in maximal
disagreement. Being inspired by the work in [14] that used
the norm and location of the highest value of pi as an
indicator of the presence of an attack and the indices of the
most likely attackers; to mitigate the impact of FDIA, step 21
is added to Algorithm 1, to restart the algorithm by isolating
the identified attacker. It must be noted, however, that the
method is more or less prone to miss identification errors
depending on the connectivity of the electric grid graph.
Termination conditions: Algorithm 1 terminates under
two scenarios. In the first scenario, the algorithm terminates
when the aggregator is in consensus with its neighboring
aggregators and has converged to a point, thus satisfying
‖x(i)k (t) − x(i)k−1(t)‖∞ ≤ . The second scenario is met
when all the aggregators have come to a consensus about the
presence as well as the identity of an FDI attacker amongst
them. We assume that in each iteration k, an individual
aggregator calculates an excluded average and an excluded
standard deviation for all the aggregator i ∈ N using (13a)
and (13b) respectively:
µi(pi) =
1
|N | − 1
∑
j∈N\{i}pii (13a)
σi(pi) =
√√√√ 1|N | − 1 ∑
j∈N\{i}
|pii − µi(pi)|2. (13b)
Since all the aggregators have the same pi vector, they all
have the same mean and standard deviations regarding the
other aggregators. For the second scenario to trigger, the pi
vector has to converge in the norm-sense, i.e, the condition
‖pik−pik−1‖∞ ≤ pi is satisfied, and pii > µi(pi)+βiσi(pi)
has to be true for some βi > 0 and i ∈ N .
Note on Stealth Attacks: Furthermore, a stealth attack can
be staged in some cases leading to a missed detection. The
global measurement vector as a result of the attack is given
by s˜ = s + a. A stealth attack can be posed by choosing
a sparse attack vector, a, where the non-zero entries corre-
spond to the sensors that are attacked, such that the constraint
h(x + a) = 0 is satisfied even with the perturbed state,
where x corresponds to the true variables. Here, without
any change in the loss function in problem (6), the attacker
is still able to alter the output of the algorithm. Such attacks
are extremely hard to detect in the absence of specially
imposed structure on the true measurement vectors, let alone
mitigate. These types of attacks are only possible when a
malicious aggregator is able to gain complete knowledge
about their neighbors’ parameters. This constitutes the worst
case scenario for an attack. Note that such attacks are not
always possible in practice, depending on the sparsity pattern
of the number of attacked sensors.
For example, consider the linear form of the power flow
equation pertaining to a region j as given in equation (5).
Suppose region j is attacked, say via FDI to its measurements
or to its ADMM update states x(j)(t), and as a consequence
of this attack, let x˜(j)(t) = x(j)(t) + a(j) be the modified
output of its ADMM state update. For region j to pose a
stealth attack on, say, region i, the attack vector a(j) has
to be chosen carefully such that the elements of the vector
are non-zero in the positions corresponding to the shared
variables with region i. Furthermore, for this digression in
the x(j)(t) iterate to affect region i’s update of x(i)(t)
adversely (that is x˜(i)(t) = x(i)(t) + a(j)), then a(j) has
to be in the null space of the system matrix H(i). Even
telling is the fact that Sija(j) has to be in the null space
of H(i)STij . To perform such an elaborate attack, region j
requires information regarding H(i)STij and moreover, there
might not exist a non-trivial null space in H(i)STij .
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, the workings of the methodology proposed
in Section IV is illustrated using a 141 bus radial distribution
feeder case [22]. The case consists of 141 buses with bus
1 considered to be a substation with infinite capacity. The
electric grid is divided into N = 7 aggregator regions, and
the set of buses belonging to different regions are indicated
using colors in Figure 3. The communication graph Gc is
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Fig. 3: Ge is the network graph corresponding to the 141 bus radial distribution feeder case. The network in the box in the
bottom right shows the communication graph Gc with the nodes representing aggregators: Ai ≡ Aggregator i, ∀i ∈ N .
also shown in Figure 3; the structure is a consequence of the
assignment of buses into different aggregator regions.
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Fig. 4: (a) Consensus and convergence of real power injec-
tions (in MW) by common variables of aggregators 1 and
2 when there is no attack. (b) Consensus but divergence
of real power injections (in MW) by common variables of
aggregators 1 and 2 when aggregator 1 is an attacker. In
this case, the verification process can not be completed. The
common variables correspond to buses 42, 43, 54, and 73 in
Figure 3. Aggregator i’s estimate of the real power injection
at bus b is denoted by p(i)b .
For the simulations, the parameters were chosen as fol-
lows: pi = 1e − 3,  = 1e − 3, αk = 1/k, c1 = c2 = 0.5,
βi = 2, ∀i ∈ N . The measurements of the available
variables, xa, were noisy versions of MATPOWER output of
the power flow calculations for the 141 bus radial distribution
feeder case. The noise, wi was chosen to be i.i.d Gaussian
with zero mean and variance 1.
When aggregator j is the attacker, the FDI attack con-
stitutes an injection of an attack vector a(j) to the com-
munications received by the neighbors of the attacker in
equation (11). In each iteration of the algorithm, the at-
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Fig. 5: The stationary distribution, pi, of B under FDI attack.
pi represents the trust score: higher the value of pir, lower is
the trust in the aggregator r.
tack vector is chosen randomly while satisfying ‖a(j)‖2 =
0.5
√
|Sjix(j)(t)|, where |Sjix(j)(t)| is the length of the
vector Sjix(j)(t), i.e., the number of common variables
shared by region j and its neighbor i. Figure 4a shows
the convergence of the four common variables shared by
aggregators 1 and 2 when there is no attack and in contrast,
Figure 4b, shows their divergence when region 1 is the
attacker. As seen in Figure 3, these four common variables
correspond to the following buses: 42, 43, 54, and 73. In
Figure 4a, both the aggregators converge to the optimal point
p?b , ∀b ∈ {42, 43, 54, 73}. The attack in Figure 4b is such
that, the parameters do come to a consensus, but do not
converge (i.e., they diverge). This will stop the verification
algorithm from finishing. To stop such kinds of attacks from
hampering our setup, we utilize the algorithm described in
Section IV.
As discussed in Section IV, the stationary distribution of,
pi, of the disagreement matrix, B, is used to detect FDI
attacks from selfish entities. Figure 5 contains seven sets
of bar plots, such that set j represents the scenario where
aggregator region j was injecting false data into Algorithm 1.
Each set contains seven bars representing the element of
vector pi corresponding to each of the seven aggregators.
It is to be noted that in Figure 5, for an aggregator, as the
height of the bar increases, it is seen as more untrustworthy
by the other aggregators. For example, in scenario 1 where
aggregator 1 is the attacker, the corresponding bar plot
indicates that the network of aggregators trust aggregator 1
the least (pi1 is highest). Similarly, in each of the other sets
j ∈ [2, . . . , 7], we set aggregator j as the attack and observe
the level of trust the network places in the aggregators. As
can be seen, in each scenario, the corresponding attacker
amasses the lowest trust level (indicated by the highest pij
value). It is interesting to note the distribution of distrust in
the network. Consider scenario 1 and notice that the distrust
is spread among aggregators 1, 2 and 4. This can be explained
by noticing the Gc graph shown in Figure 3, where we
see that aggregators 2 and 4 are neighbors of aggregator
1. Set 5 is another interesting scenario. Here, aggregator
5 is the dishonest entity, but while it is seen as the most
untrustworthy of the lot, it is not seen as untrustworthy as
the attackers from the other scenarios. We also notice that
the distrust is spread out the most here. The reason for this,
referring to Gc again, might be because aggregator 5 has one
of the highest degrees and is the only cut vertex (a vertex
that when removed (with its boundary edges) from a graph
creates more components than previously in the graph) in the
network. This method may be used to identify FDI attackers.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper discusses the lack in the resiliency of
Blockchain based Transactive Energy frameworks to threats
from within the network. The proposed Robust State Ver-
ification algorithm can output the actual state of the grid
using the sensor measurements, and is well equipped to
detect the presence of FDI attacks. The algorithm fits into
the Blockchain Transactive Energy framework between the
pricing and the billing phases, and may be used to hold
all the players accountable. The distributed architecture of
the optimization formulation is amenable to be solved via
ADMM. The algorithm converges to the actual state of the
grid in the absence of any attacks, and in the presence of
random FDIs by the attacker to the ADMM states, will
terminate with a convergence of the trust score vector using
which the attacker is identified. Future work will include
testing the algorithm in a Transactive Energy framework
empowered by a permissioned Blockchain architecture.
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